The summary below each case is prepared to offer lawyers and the public a general overview of what issues are included in a case which will be argued. The summary is not a limit on what issues a party to a case may present at oral argument.
|Wednesday, March 11, 2020|
Supreme Court Courtroom
|09:30 a.m.||(Time Limits: 15-15-5)|
2018-001878 The State, Respondent,
Sha'quille Washington, Petitioner.
Jack B. Swerling, of Columbia and Katherine Carruth Goode, of Winnsboro, for Petitioner. Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, both of Columbia and Solicitor Scarlet A. Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.
The Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in State v. Washington, 424 S.C. 374, 818 S.E.2d 459 (Ct. App. 2018).
|10:00 a.m.||(Time Limits: 10-10-5)|
2019-001604 The State of South Carolina, Petitioner,
Tony Latrell Kinard, Respondent.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia and Solicitor David M. Stumbo, of Greenwood, for Petitioner. Michael Vincent Laubshire and Richard James Dolce, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
The Court granted the State a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2953(A) (2018) in State v. Kinard, 427 S.C. 367, 831 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 2019).
|10:30 a.m.||(Time Limits: 15-15-5)|
2019-000842 The State, Petitioner,
John Kenneth Massey, Jr., Respondent.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Megan Harrigan Jameson, Senior Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia and Solicitor Kevin S. Brackett, of York, for Petitioner. Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for Respondent.
The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in State v. Massey, 426 S.C. 90, 825 S.E.2d 717 (Ct. App. 2019). The issue on appeal concerns the interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. section 16-11-10, which defines the term "dwelling" for purposes of South Carolina's first-degree burglary statute.