THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

In the Interest of Taylor K., a Juvenile Under the Age of Seventeen, Appellant.

Appeal From Kershaw County
Dana A. Morris, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.� 2012-UP-116
Submitted February 1, 2012 � Filed February 29, 2012

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., and Solicitor Daniel E. Johnson, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: �Taylor K. appeals the family court's revocation of his probation, arguing the family court erred in revoking his probation solely for his failure to pay restitution because his violation was not willful.� We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Hamilton, 333 S.C. 642, 647, 511 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The decision to revoke probation is addressed to the discretion of the [family court]."); State v. Spare, 374 S.C. 264, 269, 647 S.E.2d 706, 708 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[I]n those cases involving the failure to pay fines or restitution, the [family court] must, in addition to finding sufficient factual evidence of the violation, make an additional finding of willfulness."); id. ("Willful failure to pay means a voluntary, conscious and intentional failure."); id. at 270, 647 S.E.2d at 709 (stating a court need not consider alternatives to incarceration in accordance with Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), unless the probationer made bona fide, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to acquire the resources to pay restitution).

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.