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South Carolina
Judicial Department
2011-UP-037 - Harris v. Beaufort County Sheriff's Department

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lee W. Harris, Appellant,

v.

Beaufort County Sheriff's Department, Respondent.


Appeal From Beaufort County
Carmen Tevis Mullen, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No.2011-UP-037���
Submitted January 1, 2011 � Filed February 1, 2011


AFFIRMED


Chalmers C. Johnson, of Tacoma, for Appellant.

Mary Bass Lohr, of Beaufort, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Lee W. Harris brought an action for breach of contract after his termination from employment with the Beaufort County Sheriff's Office. �On appeal, Harris argues the trial court erred in granting the Sheriff's Office's motion for summary judgment and finding section 23-13-10 of the South Carolina Code (2007) did not preclude Harris's termination by the Sheriff's Deputy Chief. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:�

1. As to whether the trial court erred in granting Sheriff's Office's motion for summary judgment: Nelson v. Charleston Cnty. Parks & Recreation Comm'n, 362 S.C. 1, 4, 605 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Ct. App. 2004) ("When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court applies the same standard which governs the trial court . . . ."); Rule 56(c), SCRCP (finding summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law");� S.C. Code Ann. � 23-13-10 (2007) (stating a deputy serves at the pleasure of the sheriff); Botchie v. O'Dowd, 315 S.C. 126, 129, 432 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1993) ("[A] sheriff may not compromise his statutory authority to discharge deputies at his discretion. To hold otherwise renders the language of [section] 23-13-10 meaningless and eviscerates the sheriff's ability to discharge deputies at his pleasure.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2.  As to whether the trial court erred in finding section 23-13-10 of the South Carolina Code (2007) did not preclude Harris's termination by the Sheriff's Deputy Chief: Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 387 S.C. 389, 400, 693 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2010) ("It is axiomatic that for an issue to be preserved for appeal, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial court.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., SHORT, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.