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South Carolina
Judicial Department
2010-UP-521 - Davis v. Waggoners Trucking

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Edward Allen Davis, Respondent,

v.

The Waggoners Trucking, Employer,

And The Waggoners Trucking, Self-Insured, Carrier, Appellant.


Appeal From the Appellate Panel
of the Workers' Compensation Commission


Unpublished Opinion No.�� 2010-UP-521
Submitted December 1, 2010 � Filed December 9, 2010


AFFIRMED


David Hill Keller, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Blake Alexander Hewitt, of Columbia, and Matthew� Jackson, of North Charleston, for Respondent.�

PER CURIAM: Edward Allen Davis filed a claim for injuries resulting from an unexplained fall while working for The Waggoners Trucking (Employer), and the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate Panel) awarded him benefits.� Employer appeals, arguing Davis failed to meet his burden of proof and the Appellate Panel failed to adjudicate this matter correctly.� We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:�

1. As to whether the Appellate Panel erred in failing to require Davis to demonstrate his injuries were "made worse by striking the floor of the trailer than they would have been had he struck the ground":� S.C. Code Ann. � 42-1-160(A) (Supp. 2009) (providing an injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) if the injury occurs accidentally, "arising out of and in the course of employment"); Crosby v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., 330 S.C. 489, 493, 499 S.E.2d 253, 255 (Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing injuries are excluded from compensability under the Act when they come "from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment"); Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell, Inc., 227 S.C. 444, 452-53, 88 S.E.2d 611, 614-15 (1955) (holding injuries resulting from unexplained falls are generally excluded from compensability, but recognizing an exception to the rule when the employment contributed to either the cause or the effect of the fall); West v. Alliance Capital, 368 S.C. 246, 252, 628 S.E.2d 279, 282 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Douglas v. Spartan Mills, Startex Div., 245 S.C. 265, 269, 140 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1965) ("The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood.� It must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant.� It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.")).�

2. As to Employer's remaining arguments concerning the necessity for expert medical testimony and classification of Davis's claim as a "medically complex" case:� Rule 210(h), SCACR ("[An] appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal."); Stone v. Roadway Express, 367 S.C. 575, 582, 627 S.E.2d 695, 698 (2006) ("Only issues raised [to] and ruled upon by the [Workers' Compensation C]ommission are cognizable on appeal."); Bonaparte v. Floyd, 291 S.C. 427, 444, 354 S.E.2d 40, 50 (Ct. App. 1987) (placing upon appellant the burden of providing a record on appeal sufficient for intelligent review).�

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., SHORT, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.�


[1] �We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.