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South Carolina
Judicial Department
2009-UP-384 - Brown v. Brown

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ellen Carver Brown, Respondent,

v.

Marion Junior Brown, Appellant.


Appeal From Chesterfield County
�Roger E. Henderson, Family Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-384
Submitted May 1, 2009 � Filed July 6, 2009��


AFFIRMED


James C. Cox and Terence A. Quinn, both of Hartsville, for Appellant.

Jack E. Cohoon, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:� Marion Junior Brown (Husband) argues the family court erred in: (1) misapprehending the parties' agreement that provided he would transfer his interest in certain property to his sons, Douglas and Cory; (2) allowing either Husband or Ellen Carver Brown (Wife) to purchase the other's interest in the marital home for $12,500, upon forty-five days notice; and (3) in awarding Wife $18,571.70 of Husband's workers' compensation settlement.� We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:� Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 61, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006) ("In appeals from the family court, the appellate court has the authority to find the facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence."); Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 540, 615 S.E.2d 98, 102 (2005) ("However, this broad scope of review does not require the appellate court to disregard the findings of the family court."); Latimer v. Farmer, 360 S.C. 375, 380, 602 S.E.2d 32, 34 (2004) ("Neither is the appellate court required to ignore the fact that the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony."); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 355-56, 461 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1995) (finding alleged inaccuracies in an order are not preserved for appeal where no post-trial motion was filed raising such an issue); Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 215, 363 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding the family court's valuation of property should be affirmed where it is within the range of evidence); Marsh v. Marsh, 313 S.C. 42, 44, 437 S.E.2d 34, 35 (1993) (stating that in cases dealing with the distribution of a workers' compensation settlement, the proper inquiry is whether the property in question was acquired during the marriage, and if so, whether the property falls into a statutory exception of the equitable distribution statute).

AFFIRMED.[1]

HEARN, C.J., and THOMAS, J., and KONDUROS, J., concur.�


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.