THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
John R. Cammer, Jr., Personal Representative of the Estate of John R. Cammer, Sr., Appellant,
v.
Thomas B. Ferguson, Jr., M.D., Respondent.
Appeal From Charleston County
Perry M. Buckner, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No.� 2009-UP-366
Heard May 13, 2009 � Filed June 25, 2009
AFFIRMED
Justin S. Kahn, and Ellis I. Kahn, both of Charleston, for Appellant.
Molly H. Craig, Robert H. Hood, and Jennifer F. Nutter, all of Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM:� In this medical malpractice action, John R. Cammer, Jr. asserts the trial court erred in finding Dr. Thomas B. Ferguson, Jr. was an employee of a charitable organization and entitled to the protections under Section 33-56-180(A) of the South Carolina Code (2006).[1]� Cammer further asserts the trial court abused its discretion in excluding certain expert testimony and in limiting cross examination concerning Dr. Ferguson's credibility and qualifications.� We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Todd's Ice Cream, Inc. v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 281 S.C. 254, 259, 315 S.E.2d 373, 376 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Where the evidence relating to whether an individual is an independent contractor or employee is conflicting or where more than one inference can be derived therefrom, the question is one of fact."); Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976) (stating questions of fact in law actions are subject to review under the any evidence standard); Gamble v. Int'l Paper Realty Corp. of South Carolina, 323 S.C. 367, 373, 474 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1996) (the admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse); Rule 403, SCRE (allowing exclusion of evidence where its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury).
AFFIRMED.
HUFF, PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
[1] The parties consented to the resolution of this issue by the trial judge rather than the jury.