S.E. 2d
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
In the Matter of Horace
A. Smith, Respondent.
Opinion No. 25028
Heard October 20, 1999 - Filed December 6, 1999
PUBLIC REPRIMAND AND SUSPENSION
Horace A. Smith, of Columbia, Pro Se Respondent.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon and Assistant
Deputy Attorney General J. Emory Smith, Jr. ; both
of Columbia, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
PER CURM: In this attorney grievance matter, Horace A.
Smith ("Attorney") is charged with engaging in misconduct in violation of
various provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct contained in Rule 407,
SCACR, and the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule
413, SCACR.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 1,1996, the Commission on Lawyer Conduct (the "Commission")
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IN THE MATTER OF SMITH
served Attorney with a notice and complaint alleging misconduct during the
representation of a client, Ronald Quarles, on a shoplifting charge in municipal
court. The charges alleged that during Quarles's trial Attorney argued with the
court after the court had made rulings, made inappropriate gestures,
interrupted the testimony of witnesses, and mumbled inappropriate comments
despite warnings not to do so. Attorney filed an answer denying the allegations
in the complaint.
A hearing convened on June 12, 1996 to consider the allegations brought
against Attorney. The Commission found that Attorney had committed
misconduct and recommended an indefinite suspension from the practice of law
until Attorney could show that he is mentally and physically capable of the
practice of law. The Commission petitioned this Court to place Attorney on
temporary suspension until Attorney's case concluded. At that time, Attorney
petitioned this Court to be placed on disability inactive status based on his
suffering from diabetes, pancreatitis, and depression. On January 22, 1997,
this Court placed Attorney on disability inactive status.
In light of Attorney being placed on disability inactive status, the Interim
Review Committee found the Commission's recommended sanction of indefinite
suspension too harsh. On January 23, 1998, this Court remanded Attorney's
case to the Commission so that more information could be obtained concerning
Attorney's current medical condition and to consider the proposed sanctions in
light of Attorney's previous suspension ten years earlier. See In re Smith, 296
S.C. 86, 370 S.E.2d 876 (1988).
On May 13,1998, the Commission filed and sent Attorney a second notice
of formal charges. These charges alleged Attorney engaged in misconduct while
representing inmate Michael Ray McCreight as the court-appointed attorney
for McCreight's PCR application. The notice alleged that Attorney never visited
McCreight to discuss his case, he failed to respond to McCreight's letters, and
he did not file any papers on McCreight's behalf. After McCreight filed his
complaint with the Commission, an investigator scheduled an interview that
Attorney failed to attend.
On July 22, 1998, a sub-panel convened to discuss both the Quarles and
McCreight matters. This first hearing was adjourned so that Attorney could
undergo a psychological evaluation. The sub-panel reconvened on September
16, 1998, and heard testimony from Dr. Robert Deysach, Ph.D., a clinical
psychologist; Dr. Harold Morgan, a board certified psychiatrist; Dr. Henry
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IN THE MATTER OF SMITH
Martin, a general practitioner; Attorney's niece Tiffany Jennings; and Attorney.
As to the Quarles matter, the medical experts testified extensively about
Attorney's medical condition and the effects his diabetes, pancreatitis, and
depression may have had on his behavior. Also, Attorney admitted all of the
allegations made against him in the McCreight matter. After the hearing, the
Commission made the following conclusions:
1. In the Quarles matter, the Commission recommended the Court
suspend Attorney for one year and require Attorney to: (1) complete
a course with Law Office Management Assistance Program
(LOMAP); (2) file with the Clerk medical statements showing his
ability to practice law; and (3) enter into some type of supervisory
relationship with another attorney for two years;
2. In the McCreight matter, the Commission determined that
Attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and the former
Rule on Disciplinary Procedure, including that he:
a. Failed to act with reasonable diligence in representing a
client [Rule 1.3];
b. Failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status
of the matter and comply promptly with reasonable requests
for information [Rule 1.4(a)];
c. Engaged in conduct demonstrating a lack of professional
competence in the practice of law [Rule 1.1 and former Rule
413, 5(E)];
d. Engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice [Rule 8.4(e)];
e. Engaged in conduct tending to pollute the administration of
justice or to bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute
and engaged in conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice
law [former Rule 413, 5(D)].
3. As punishment in the McCreight matter, the Commission
recommended a one-year suspension.
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IN THE MATTER OF SMITH
Under the Commission's recommendation, Attorney would receive a two-year
suspension made retroactive to January 22,1997. Attorney would also have to
comply with the suggested restrictions on his practice.
SANCTION
Since Attorney does not make any legal arguments to this Court, the only
issue is the proper sanction for Attorney's disrespectful action in the Quarles
matter and the neglect of his duties in the McCreight matter.
I. QUARLES MATTER
The Commission recommends a suspension of one-year for Attorney's
misbehavior in front of the municipal court. We disagree.
While the Commission's findings are entitled to great weight, this Court
has the ultimate authority to discipline attorneys. Matter of Hall, 333 S.C. 247,
509 S.E.2d 266 (1998). The Court must administer the sanction it deems
appropriate after a thorough review of the record. Matter of Kirven, 267 S.C.
669, 230 S.E.2d 899 (1976). In determining the appropriate punishment, this
Court has looked to the punishment given to other attorneys for similar
behavior. See Matter of Fox, 327 S.C. 293, 490 S.E.2d 265 (1997).
A one-year suspension from the practice of law goes much farther than a
any punishment we have previously given to an attorney for such misbehavior
in a judicial proceeding. In cases where attorneys have behaved much worse
than Attorney, a public reprimand has been the strongest punishment given as
discipline. See Matter of Goude, 296 S.C. 510, 374 S.E.2d 496 (1988)(issuing a
public reprimand for public outburst and shouting following a trial). Even
where the attorney's disruptive behavior has been the abuse of a third party in
a deposition, the punishment has been no more severe than a public reprimand.
See Matter of Golden, 329 S.C. 335, 496 S.E.2d 619 (1998). Even with
Attorney's prior disciplinary problems, we conclude a public reprimand is the
appropriate sanction in this matter. We find the other recommendations are
reasonable in light of Attorney's medical condition.
II. THE MCCREIGHT MATTER
The Commission recommends that Attorney receive a one-year
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IN THE MATTER OF SMITH
suspension as punishment for his neglect of a client's case. We agree.
As this Court stated in Matter of Moore, 329 S.C. 294, 494 S.E.2d 804
(1997):
The appropriate sanction for neglect of several client matters
generally is a public reprimand provided the clients are not greatly
prejudiced. Matter of Alexander, 301 S.C. 212, 391 S.E.2d 254
(1990); Matter of Gates, 295 S.C. 516, 369 S.E.2d 841 (1988).
However, when the client is prejudiced and the attorney refused to
cooperate with the Board's investigation, the sanction imposed has
been as great as a one year suspension. See Matter of Acker, 308
S.C. 338, 417 S.E.2d 862 (1992) (six month suspension); Matter of
Palmer, 298 S.C. 324, 380 S.E.2d 813 (1989) (one year suspension);
Matter of Ballard, 312 S.C. 227, 439 S.E.2d 846 (1994) (one year
suspension).
In this matter, Attorney's behavior prejudiced McCreight's interests.
Furthermore, Attorney failed to make a scheduled meeting with an investigator
in the matter, claiming he overslept and had no transportation. In light of
Attorney's previous disciplinary record, a one-year suspension from the practice
of law is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
We agree with the :Commission's recommendation that Attorney's
suspension be made retroactive to the date he was placed on disability inactive
status. Furthermore, we agree with the restrictions recommended by the
Commission and direct that Attorney file with the Clerk medical statements
showing his ability to practice law and enter into some type of supervisory
relationship with another attorney for two years. As for the Commission's
recommendation that Attorney complete a LOMAP course, this program is no
longer offered. In its place, we direct that Attorney complete a similar program
to be fashioned by the South Carolina Bar and Disciplinary Counsel.
Since Attorney is still on disability inactive status, he must petition the
Court to have his status changed before the Committee on Character and
Fitness can consider an application for reinstatement. If Attorney files such a
petition within 30 days of this opinion, then the Court will direct that Attorney's
petition for removal from disability inactive status and his application for
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IN THE MATTER OF SMITH
reinstatement be considered together.
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